Direction, Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta

Several times an issue as regards the obiter dicta and ratio decidendi comes in front of the court. Why ratio of any judgment is important is simply because of the reason that said portion is considered as the relevant part of the judgment which has to be followed. This ratio of the judgment is sometimes accompanied by the remarks or some casual observations made by then judgment which are not binding on anyone, and are considered to be the informal portion of the judgment. One such question has been considered by the Supreme Court recently in the case of Arun Kumar Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, wherein it has been held by the court that the impugned part of the order made by the special judge court was not ratio, and in fact it was mere obiter dicta and is not enforceable. The relevant portion which is a matter of dispute in the present appeal can be read as

Therefore matter may be taken up seeking necessary sanction to prosecute the accused persons Raghav Chandra, Shri Ram Meshram and Shahjaad Khan to prosecute them under Section 13 (1-d), 13 (2) Anti Corruption Act and under Section 120-B I.P.C. and for necessary further action, case be registered in the criminal case diary.

It is clear from the reading of the above portion of the judgement delivered by the special judge that it is not mandatory to prosecute the accused persons, and it can be concluded from the use of word “may”. Distinction between Sanction and Permission was also drawn in this case while referring to the case of Rameshwar Bhartia v. The State of Assam, 1953 SCR 126, where this court held that

"15. But where a prosecution is directed, it means that the authority who gives the direction is satisfied in his own mind that the case must be initiated. Sanction is in the nature of a permission, while a direction is in the nature of a command."

Court further referred to the case of Giani Devender Singh v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 391, where it was held by the Supreme Court that

"10. It appears to us that when the High Court was not in a position to precisely discern what was the complaint alleged by the petitioner and when the High Court was of the view that the prayer made by the petitioner was absurd and it also held that the officers who were alleged to have been carrying on nefarious activities were more imaginary than real, the direction in general and sweeping terms to sack erring officers (whomsoever they may be) and overhaul the administration by recruiting only conscientious and devoted people like the petitioner in order to satisfy the vanity of the petitioner, should not have been made. If the High Court intends to pass an order on an application presented before it by treating it as a public interest litigation, the High Court must precisely indicate the allegations or the statements contained in such petition relating to public interest litigation and should indicate how public interest was involved and only after ascertaining the correctness of the allegation, should give specific direction as may deem just and proper in the facts of the case.

11. It appears to us that the application was disposed of by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in a lighter vein and the order dated 27-2-1992 is couched in veiled sarcasm. Such course of action, to say the least, is not desirable and the High Court should not have issued mandate in general and sweeping terms which were not intended to be implemented and were not capable of being implemented because of utter vagueness of the mandate and of its inherent absurdity.

It is interesting here to note that the judgment of the special court was reversed by the high court on the ground that the impugned portion of the judgment was in fact direction issued by the court to initiate prosecution. But, this was again reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground the ground that judgment nowhere clearly mentions the authority on which direction was issued by the special judge, and further it was held by the court that it would be correct to imagine that remarks made by the special judge were in fact directions. Court further held that it is a well settled principle that obiter dicta is the mere observation made by the judge while delivering judgment, and it is the not the essential part of the judgment. Court, while opining this relied on the case of State of Haryana v. Ranbir, (2006) 5 SCC 167, wherein it was held by the court that –

"A decision, it is well settled, is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. The distinction between a dicta and obiter is well known. Obiter dicta is more or less presumably unnecessary to the decision. It may be an expression of a viewpoint or sentiments which has no binding effect. See ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla. It is also well settled that the statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi constitute obiter dicta and are not authoritative. (See Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty)"

Court further relied on the case of Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555, where it held that –

"Thus, observations of the Court did not relate to any of the legal questions arising in the case and, accordingly, cannot be considered as the part of ratio decidendi. Hence, in light of the aforementioned judicial pronouncements, which have well settled the proposition that only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding or authoritative precedent, it is clear that the reliance placed on mere general observations or casual expressions of the Court, is not of much avail to the respondents."