Thursday, August 28, 2014

Gift of Property under Muslim Law cannot be Conditional but Absolute

In a recent decision [V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani (D) by L.Rs. v. Shaik Abdul Rahim & Anr], the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) has had the occasion to deal with an intricate question under Muslim Succession Law – whether there can be a conditional gift of a (immovable) property? In 1952, Sheikh Hussein gifted a ‘titled house’ (through an executed gift deed) to his wife, Banu Bibi. It was stipulated in the deed that Banu Bibi would enjoy the property during her lifetime and would not alienate it. However, the property could devolve in favour of her off spring after her death, and in case she does not have any children, the property would be returned back to Hussein or his near successors. Notwithstanding the conditions under the deed, Banu Bibi sold the house in 1978 to V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani (Appellant – represented by his Legal Representatives). Consequently after Banu Bibi’s death, the Respondents (Shaik Abdul Rahim and Abdul Gaffor) staked claim over impugned house on the ground that, (i) Babu Bibi only had a ‘life interest’ in the property and could not have alienated it, and (ii) being legal representatives of Sheikh Hussein, right and title over the property came to be vested on them.

Principal Senior Civil Judge dismissed Respondents’ claim for the reason that since the gift deed was not in nature of usufruct, the gifted property came to be ‘irrevocably’ vested on Babu Bibi. As such, the conditions in the gift deed, limiting her rights, were void [Relied on: Nawazish  Ali Khan  v. Ali  Raza Khan, AIR 1948  PC 34]. Against this order, the Respondent filed first appeal. While reversing the order of Senior Civil Judge, the First Appellate Court relied on the ‘text’ of the gift deed that had limited the rights of Banu Bibi and had provided that the property would be returned back to Hussein or his near successors. Dissatisfied with the judgement of First Appellate Court, the Appellant filed an appeal before the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh (“High Court”). Appellant did not get any relief and the High Court, again relying on the text of the gift deed, affirmed the First Appellate Court’s order.

When the matter came before the Supreme Court (through a Special Leave Petition), the court first pointed that none of the appellate courts had determined the ‘nature and effect’ of the gift; rather, they had treated the controversy as a dispute to factual situation. That is, it was not considered by the appellate courts whether the gift was with respect to corpus of the immovable property or was its usufruct. Under Muslim Law, a gift has to be ‘unconditional’ and where a gift is made with fasid or invalid conditions, the gift will be valid and conditions void [See: Asaf A.A.Fyzee, ‘Outlines of  Muhammadan  Law’,  5th Ed.,  edited  and  revised  by Tahir Mahmood, Oxford University Press]. Similarly, where a gift is made subject to certain conditions thereby derogating the ‘completeness of the grant’, gift will take effect as if no conditions were mentioned [See: ‘Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law’, 19th Ed., by  M. Hidayatullah  and  Arshad Hidayatullah]. Hence, a ‘conditional gift’ is valid but the conditions are void. The court referred to Privy Council’s decision in Nawazish  Ali Khan (supra) wherein a distinction was drawn between the corpus of the property (ayn) and the usufruct in the property (manafi) in the following terms:

“...What Muslim law does recognise and insist upon, is the distinction between the corpus  of  the  property  itself  (ayn)  and  the usufruct  in  the  property  (manafi).  Over the corpus of property the law recognises only absolute dominion, heritable and unrestricted in point of time; and where a gift of the corpus seeks to impose a condition inconsistent with such absolute dominion the condition is rejected as repugnant;  but  interests  limited  in point of time can be created in the usufruct of the  property  and  the  dominion  over  the  corpus takes effect subject to any such limited interests....

..... Muslim law admits only ownership unlimited in duration, but recognises interests of limited duration in the use of property....

.......Their Lordships feel no doubt that in dealing with a gift under Muslim law, the first duty of the Court is to construe the gift. If it is a gift of the corpus, then any condition which derogates from absolute dominion over the subject of the gift will be rejected as repugnant; but if upon construction the gift is held to be one of a limited interest the gift can take effect out of the usufruct, leaving the ownership of the corpus  unaffected  except  to  the  extent  to  which its enjoyment is postponed for the duration of the limited interest.”

In other words, with respect to a property, there can be forms of transfers – first, where property in itself is transferred, for e.g., its title; and second, where only interest in the property is transferred (for e.g., rent, profits, permission to live for a certain duration etc.). As such, there is a distinction between the transfer of thing itself and transfer of use of the thing. The Supreme Court, in V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani (supra), i.e., the present case, summed up the legal position as follows:

(i)                Gifts, contemplating the transfer of corpus of the property, are absolute in nature with conditions therein void. Transfer of corpus refers to the change in ownership.

(ii)             Conditions are however permissible, if the gift is merely of a usufruct. Transfer of usufruct refers to a change in the right of its use/enjoyment etc

Stating this legal position, the Court found the gift deed in the present case to have contemplated the transfer of the ‘corpus of the property’. The reasons which weighed the decision of the court were, (i) all rights of the donor, including title, were sought to be transferred; (ii) Conveyance was not intended to be cancelled; (iii) The property could be transferred to Banu Bibi’s successors and the same would not be assailed; (iv) By mutating Banu Bibi’s name in revenue records, the intention was to make the gift deed public; and (v) Donor did not retain any documents with respect to the property. Since it was the ‘corpus of the property’ which had been transferred, the conditions in the gift deed limiting Banu Bibi’s rights were held to be void. The appeal was thus allowed by the Court. 

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