Showing posts with label CPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CPC. Show all posts

Monday, July 15, 2013

Conclusiveness of “Foreign Judgment” under Section 13, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) provides that a foreign judgment, which directly adjudicates a matter between two parties, shall be conclusive as far as that matter is concerned. However, Section 13 also provides for the conditions which, if satisfied, will affect the conclusiveness of the judgment. In total, six conditions have been stipulated under the section.

At the outset, it should be understood that the rules provided under Section 13 of CPC are rules of substantive law and not merely of procedure.[1] The expression “matter” in Section 13 is not equivalent to subject-matter: it means the right claimed.[2]While determining the validity of a foreign judgement, it should also be noted that a court of a foreign country has no jurisdiction to deliver a judgment capable of enforcement, or recognition in another country in any proceeding the subject-matter of which is title to immovable property outside that country.[3]Hence, a foreign decree, related to the title of an immovable property, may not be enforceable.

The binding character of the foreign judgment may be displaced only by establishing that the case falls within one or more of the six clauses of Section 13, and not otherwise. Further, it is the judgment which is conclusive and not the reasons.[4]The competence contemplated by Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is in an international sense, and not merely by the law of the foreign State in which the Court delivering judgment functions.[5]

One of the conditions contemplated under Section 13, for challenging the conclusiveness of foreign judgment, is the violation of natural justice. However, there would be no violation of natural justice when, on being served with notice, a party makes a choice as to not present itself before the court.[6] Interestingly, if one of the defendants dies and his legal representatives happen to be non-resident foreigners, then the court, where suit was initially initiated, would still be competent to try it.[7]

In cases related to child custody issues, a careful consideration should be given while determining the validity of a foreign decree.[8]Hence, in matters relating to matrimony and custody, the law of that place must govern which has the closest concern with the well-being of the spouses and the welfare of the off-springs of marriage.[9]

Supreme Court, in Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi,[10] laid down the rules in relation to the validity of foreign matrimonial judgements:

From the aforesaid discussion the following rule can be deduced for recognising a foreign matrimonial judgment in this country. The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows: (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.

Under Section 13(b), burden to prove that the decree is not on merits is on the person alleging it. However, courts, in such a situation, do not expect one to adduce impossible proofs.[11]We conclude this post thereby providing a brief overview of Section 13 of CPC.




[1] Moloji Nar Singh Rao Shitole v. Shankar Saran, (1963) 2 SCR 577:AIR 1962 SC 1737
[2] R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, (1963) 3 SCR 22:AIR 1963 SC 1
[3] R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, (1963) 3 SCR 22:AIR 1963 SC 1
[4] Id
[5] Id
[6] Lalji Raja and Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram, (1971) 1 SCC 721; International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265
[7] Andhra Bank Ltd. v. Srinivasan, (1962) 3 SCR 391:AIR 1962 SC 232
[8] Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo, (2011) 6 SCC 479
[9] Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu, (1984) 3 SCC 698
[10] Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, (1991) 3 SCC 451, 462
[11] International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265

Friday, July 12, 2013

Section 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: An Overview and Analysis

Had it been possible for one to institute different suits, having identical subject matter, in different courts, the result would have been nothing less than a chaos. However, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), takes care of this problem. Section 10 of CPC provides that:

“No Court shall proceed......any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit......”

Under Section 10 of CPC, multiplicity of proceedings is intended to be avoided, i.e., for its application, the subject matter in a subsequent suit should be similar. Hence, Section 10 will not apply where a few of the matters in issue are common and will apply only when the entire subject-matter in controversy is same. In other words, the matter in issue is not equivalent to any of the questions in issue.[1]This proposition also finds support from the words "directly and substantially in issue", which have been used in contra-distinction to the words "incidentally or collaterally in issue" [Supreme Court].[2] As far as the word “matter in issue” is concerned, according to Delhi High Court, it means all disputed material questions in the subsequent suit which are directly and substantially in question in the previous suit.[3]Hence, according to the court, these are material questions which have to be looked into, and not any question. However, in another case, Delhi High Court held that it is not the identity of the main issue or some of the issues, but the identity of the matter which is the determining test.[4] In other words, it is not the identity of the cause of action but the matters in issue involved in the subsequent suit and the previous suit.[5]

According to the Supreme Court, Section 10 has been construed by the courts as not a bar to the passing of interlocutory orders such as an order for consolidation of the later suit with the earlier suit, or appointment of a Receiver or an injunction or attachment before judgment.[6]

Delhi High Court has, in Smt. Meena Bhandari v. Smt. Krishna Kumari & Ors,[7] after considering various judgments of the Supreme Court, laid down the following essential conditions for the applicability of Section 10 of CPC

Thus, there are four essential conditions for attracting the application of Section 10, C.P.C.

(1) That the matter in issue in the second suit is also directly and substantially in issue in the first suit; (2) that the parties in the second suit are the same or parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title; (3) that the Court in which the first suit is instituted is competent to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit; (4) that the previously instituted suit is pending (a) in the same Court in which the second suit is brought, or (b) in any Court in India, or (c) in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government, or (d) before the Supreme Court.

The object of Section 10 is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the same parties in respect of the same matter in issue.[8] The section enacts merely a rule of procedure and a decree passed in contravention thereof is not a nullity; hence, a court can decide relevant issues where a subsequently instituted suit can be decided on purely legal points without taking evidence.[9] The provisions of Section 10 do not become inapplicable on a Court holding that the previously instituted suit is a vexatious suit or has been instituted in violation of the terms of the contract.[10] Even in a situation when Section 10, C.P.C. does not strictly apply, for ends of justice, suit may be stayed under Section 151, C.P.C.[11]Interestingly, Section 10 is also applicable to the summary suits which are to be tried by the special procedure the laid down in Order XXXVII of the CPC.[12]

Delhi High Court has interpreted the decision of Supreme Court, in Gupte Cardiac Care Centre & Hospital vs. Olympic Pharma Care (P) Ltd,[13] thereby acknowledging that the test of 'directly and substantially in issue', as per Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is to see: whether the two suits arise out of the same transaction.[14] Section 10 cannot be interpreted to hold that since only proceeding with the trial of issue or suit is restricted by Section 10, C.P.C., therefore, it impliedly accepts maintainability of more than one suit by one plaintiff.[15]

For the application of Section 10, it is not sufficient that the parties are same or the subject-matter of the suits is same but the issues involved therein also should be same or substantially same and the relief which has been sought by the plaintiff in both the suits also should be substantially same.[16]

Delhi High Court has also differentiated between Section 10 & Section 11 of CPC, thereby holding that:

“The difference between section 10 and section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is well known. In section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure the matter in issue in the earlier instituted suit and the subsequently instituted suit should be directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit. Under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure mere pendency of the earlier suit which is not material but the civil suit should have been heard and finally decided between the parties.” [17]

As far as the applicability of explanation to Section 10, in relation to foreign courts, is concerned, Delhi High Court has held that:

“With due respect, we cannot concur with the reasoning that Explanation to Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would operate conversely to enable a foreign court to assume jurisdiction in respect of a cause of action which is pending adjudication in this country.”[18]

As we conclude this post, we are assuming that it would have been able to provide a brief analysis of Section of 10. In the next post, we shall write about the other provisions of CPC.



[1] Aspi Jal v. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor, (2013) 4 SCC 333 at page 338
[2] National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256
[3] Sagar Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana and Anr v. The Union of India and Ors., AIR 1979 Delhi 118, (1979) ILR 1 Delhi 492
[4] Rajdhani Flour Mills Ltd. v.Uttam Agro Foods (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (66) DRJ 111
[5] Laxmi Fruit Co. v. Gainda Ram & Co., 1983 (4) DRJ 221, 1983 RLR 100
[6] Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd.,  AIR 1998 SC 1952
[7] 2000 1 AWC 786 All, 2000 91 RD 297
[8] National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256, 259; British Indian Corporation v. Rashtraco Freight Carriers, 1996 (4) SCC 748
[9]  Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna, (2004) 7 SCC 251 at page 254
[10] Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450:AIR 1962 SC 527
[11] Atul Chandra Bora v.  Assam Tea Brokers Pvt. Ltd., Gawahati, AIR 1995 Gau 73
[12] s:Maharashtra State Co-operative marketing Federation Ltd., Bombay v. Indian Bank, Bombay, AIR1 997 Bom 186, 1996 (2) MhLj 925
[13] Gupte Cardiac Care Centre & Hospital vs. Olympic Pharma Care (P) Ltd, (2004) 6 SCC 756
[14] Filo Interior Decorations Pvt. Ltd. V. L.K. Modi & Ors., FAO (OS) 650/2010 [Delhi High Court]
[15] Ranbir Singh v Balbir Singh, CS(OS) NO. 802 OF 2002 [Delhi High Court]
[16] Sairabi Sayyad Abdul Aziz deceased through her L.Rs. and Ors. v.  Abdul Rashid Abdul Majid, 2002 (3) BomCR 139
[17] Maxwell Securities Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. V. National Stock Exchange of India Limited, 2001 (60) DRJ 685
[18]Essel Sports Pvt. Ltd. (Indian Cricket League) v. Board of Control for Cricket in India and Ors., 178 (2011) DLT 465, 178 (2011) DLT 465, (2011) ILR 5 Delhi 585