Objections to Jurisdiction of Court Under Section 21, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“Code”) provides the grounds for objecting the jurisdiction of a court. There are three forms of objections stipulated under the section: (i) Objection as to the place of suing, (ii) objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction, and (iii) objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction. According to the section, such objections to jurisdiction should be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. In order that an objection to the place of suing may be entertained by an appellate or revisional court, the fulfilment of the following three conditions is essential[1]:

“(1) The objection was taken in the Court of first instance.

(2) It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement.

(3) There has been a consequent failure of justice.”

The principle underlying section 21 is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction, i.e., when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice.[2] Objections to the jurisdiction of a court are distinct from the objections to the competency of a court; the latter goes to the very root of the jurisdiction.[3] Whereas in the former case, the appellate court may not interfere with the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be interfered with.[4]

Suits for Compensation for Wrongs to Person or Movables: Section 19, CPC, 1908

Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“Code”) allows a court to entertain a suit for ‘compensation’ where wrong is done to the person or to movable property.  At the outset, it should be understood that if a suit is regulated by the provisions of section 19, the provisions of section 20 of the Code would not come into operation.[1] For the applicability of section 19, two conditions needs to be satisfied: (i) wrong is done within jurisdiction a one court, and (not ‘or’) (ii) defendant resides (or carries on business, or personally works for gain) within the jurisdiction of other court. The conjunction "and" in the qualifying clause leaves aside the cases  where both the conditions  together are not available; in such matters, suits are governed by other provisions of the Code.[2] When these conditions are satisfied, at the option of the plaintiff, either of the courts can entertain the suit for compensation.

For the purpose of interpretation of the section, one of the most important issues is the meaning of the phrase ‘wrong done’, i.e., when can it be said that some wrong is done by the defendant? According to the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench), phrase ‘wrong done’ take in not only the initial action complained but also the resultant effect.[3] The Court  within whose  local  jurisdiction  damage  was  caused  or  suffered  or  sustained  would  clearly  answer  the requirements  of  Section  19  for  the  purpose  of  suits  mentioned  therein. For instance, when wrongful action of defendant takes place within the jurisdiction of one court, and the plaintiff is affected by that action for all purposes in his business within the jurisdiction of other Court.

Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: An Overview

Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“Code”) provides that suits relating to immovable property shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situated. However, there is also a proviso which provides that where relief (respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property) can be ‘entirely obtained’ through defendant’s personal obedience, suit can be instituted in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain (The underlined part can also be found in clause (a) and (b) of section 20 of the Code). Explaining the scope of section 16, the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”), in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd.,[1] opined that:

“16. Section 16 thus recognises a well-established principle that actions against res or property should be brought in the forum where such res is situate. A court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is not situate has no power to deal with and decide the rights or interests in such property. In other words, a court has no jurisdiction over a dispute in which it cannot give an effective judgment. The proviso to Section 16, no doubt, states that though the court cannot, in case of immovable property situate beyond jurisdiction, grant a relief in rem still it can entertain a suit where relief sought can be obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant. The proviso is based on a well-known maxim “equity acts in personam”, recognised by the Chancery Courts in England. The Equity Courts had jurisdiction to entertain certain suits respecting immovable properties situated abroad through personal obedience of the defendant. The principle on which the maxim was based was that the courts could grant relief in suits respecting immovable property situate abroad by enforcing their judgments by process in personam i.e. by arrest of the defendant or by attachment of his property.”

Where the main part of section 16 is applicable, section 20 of the Code would have no application in view of the opening words in section 20 “subject to the limitations thereof”.[2] Where a suit is filed for recovery of immovable properties or determination of any right or for interest in immovable properties, only the Court within whose local limits the properties are situated shall have the jurisdiction.[3] In other words, the language of section 16 is very wide and all cases, in which prayer for declaration of any right or interest in immovable property is made or its sale is asked for, must be filed in the Court which has territorial jurisdiction over such immovable property.[4]

'Res Judicata' under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Section 11)

Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“Code”) restricts a court from trying “any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court”. The section enunciates the principle of res judicata, an essential condition of which is that there must be a formal adjudication between the parties after full hearing; that is, the matter must be finally decided between the parties.[1] The question of res judicata has got to be decided with reference to the final decision in the earlier litigation because the words in para 1 of Section 11 of the Code are that the matter directly and substantially in issue in the second suit has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit and “has been heard and finally decided”.[2]In Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa,[3] the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) had laid down the following conditions to prove res judicata:

“(1) that the litigating parties must be the same;

(2) that the subject-matter of the suit also must be identical;

(3) that the matter must be finally decided between the parties; and

(4) that the suit must be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

The principle is based on two maxims derived from Roman jurisprudence: firstly, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium — it concerns the State that there be an end to law suits; and, secondly, nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem cause — no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause.[4] In other words, the principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving finality to judicial decisions.[5]As the doctrine of res judicata (which is a branch of the law of estoppels) is based on public policy and justice, section 11 of the Code is not exhaustive of it. The reason for the specific provisions of Section 11 is not that the legislature intended to bar the application of the general principles of res judicata to suits when the ‘previous decision’ is arrived at in proceedings other than suits.[6]Hence, in Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat (Constitutional Bench),[7] while opining that the decision of a High Court in a writ petition on the merits on a matter would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, the Supreme Court held that:

Jurisdiction of Civil Court under section 9, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) provides that a court “shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred”. Hence, as per section 9, civil courts have the inherent jurisdiction in all types of civil disputes unless a part of that jurisdiction is carved out, expressly or by necessary implication, by any statutory provision and conferred on any other tribunal or authority.[1] A party which seeks to oust the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court shall establish the right to do so, such ouster being express or implied.[2] And the provision, which ousts the jurisdiction of a civil court, must be strictly construed.[3]For instance, Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC (rejection of a plaint where suit appears to be barred by law) shall be construed strictly.[4]Where a statute provides for ouster of civil court’s jurisdiction, conditions leading to such ouster should occur on the date of the institution of proceeding and not otherwise.[5]

The question of jurisdiction is to be determined primarily on the averments made in the plaint.[6] It does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendants in the written statement. [7] Moreover, any application filed under the provisions of different statutes cannot be treated as a suit or plaint unless otherwise provided in the said Act.[8]A court having no jurisdiction cannot decide on the merits of the case but only the question of jurisdiction.[9] It is well settled that a civil court has inherent power to decide the question of its own jurisdiction, although, as a result of its enquiry, it may turn out that it has no jurisdiction over the suit.[10] The test of jurisdiction over the subject matter is whether the court or Tribunal can decide the case at all and not whether the court has authority to issue a particular kind of order in the course of deciding the case.[11] Where a court does not have jurisdiction, the same cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties.[12]

A special procedure provided in the Act, by necessary implication, may prohibit the Civil Court under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 to take cognizance of the objections arising under the Act for determination of certain question, for e.g., compensation for land acquired.[13] In such cases, there would not be repugnancy between § 9 of the Code and the special law. [14] Hence, where a tribunal is created by a special statue, it is assumed that it has ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ to decide the disputes entrusted by the statute.[15] Justice M. Hidayatullah had, while dealing with the question of civil court’s jurisdiction in relation to Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950 (Dhulabhai v. State of M.P.), [16] laid down the following guidelines for determining the jurisdiction of civil court:

Institution of a suit under Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) provides that a Court, under certain circumstances, can entertain a suit. It primarily focuses on the location of defendant and cause of action. Section 20 has been designed to secure that justice might be brought as near as possible to every man's hearthstone and that the defendant should not be put to the trouble and expense of travelling long distances in order to defend himself.[1]In other words, the principle behind the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20 is that the suit be instituted at a place where the defendant is able to defend the suit without undue trouble.[2]

Phrase “cause of action” means every fact, which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court.[3]That is, it means the bundle of facts which gives rise to a right or liability.[4] The elements of a cause of action are: first, the breach of duty owing by one person to another and; second, the damage resulting to the other from the breach, or the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right to sue.[5]

The expression “voluntarily resides”, as provided in clause (a) and (b) of Section 20, necessarily refers to natural persons and not to legal entities. Further, the expressions “carries on business” or “personally works for gain” do not refer to functions carried on by the Union of India is discharge of its executive powers conferred by Article 298 of the Constitution.[6]The Code of Civil Procedure uses the expression “corporation” as meaning a legal person and includes a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, and there is nothing in the CPC which can show that a corporation referred to under Order 20 means only a statutory corporation and not a company registered under the Indian Companies Act.[7]

Application of doctrine of dominus litus is confined only to the cause of action which would fall within Sections 15 to 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it cannot be applied where Section 20 of CPC is sought to be invoked.[8]

Moving further, the Explanation to Section 20 is actually an explanation to clause (a). It is in the nature of a clarification on the scope of clause (a) viz. as to where the corporation can be said to carry on business.[9]Focusing on the interpretation of explanation to Section 20, Supreme Court, in New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,[10] held that:

                                  “On a plain reading of the Explanation to Section 20 CPC it is clear that the Explanation consists of two parts: (i) before the word “or” appearing between the words “office in India” and the words “in respect of”, and (ii) the other thereafter. The Explanation applies to a defendant which is a corporation, which term would include even a company. The first part of the Explanation applies only to such corporation which has its sole or principal office at a particular place. In that event, the court within whose jurisdiction the sole or principal office of the company is situate will also have jurisdiction inasmuch as even if the defendant may not actually be carrying on business at that place, it will be deemed to carry on business at that place because of the fiction created by the Explanation. The latter part of the Explanation takes care of a case where the defendant does not have a sole office but has a principal office at one place and has also a subordinate office at another place. The expression “at such place” appearing in the Explanation and the word “or” which is disjunctive clearly suggest that if the case falls within the latter part of the Explanation it is not the court within whose jurisdiction the principal office of the defendant is situate but the court within whose jurisdiction it has a subordinate office which alone has the jurisdiction “in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office”.”

The section only tries to lay down certain principles for the institution of suit. This is to ensure that one does not misuse the judicial system for harassing a defendant. Interestingly, the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also.[11]From above, one can get a brief overview of the important elements of Section 20.

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[1] Laxman Prasad v. Prodigy Electronics Ltd., (2008) 1 SCC 618, 627

[2] Union of India v. Ladulal Jain, (1964) 3 SCR 624: AIR 1963 SC 1681; Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd., (2004) 4 SCC 671, 675

[3] Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai, (1994) 6 SCC 322, 328

[4] Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 1 SCC 135, 137

[5] SBI v. Ranjan Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 1 SCC 97, 102

[6] Baktawar Singh Bal Kishan v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 293, 296

[7] Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 1 SCC 286, 289

[8] Mohannakumaran Nair v. Vijayakumaran Nair, (2007) 14 SCC 426

[9] Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co., (1991) 4 SCC 270, 277

[10] New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2004) 4 SCC 677, 681

[11] Ambica Industries v. CCE, (2007) 6 SCC 769, 784

Conclusiveness of “Foreign Judgment” under Section 13, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) provides that a foreign judgment, which directly adjudicates a matter between two parties, shall be conclusive as far as that matter is concerned. However, Section 13 also provides for the conditions which, if satisfied, will affect the conclusiveness of the judgment. In total, six conditions have been stipulated under the section.

At the outset, it should be understood that the rules provided under Section 13 of CPC are rules of substantive law and not merely of procedure.[1] The expression “matter” in Section 13 is not equivalent to subject-matter: it means the right claimed.[2]While determining the validity of a foreign judgement, it should also be noted that a court of a foreign country has no jurisdiction to deliver a judgment capable of enforcement, or recognition in another country in any proceeding the subject-matter of which is title to immovable property outside that country.[3]Hence, a foreign decree, related to the title of an immovable property, may not be enforceable.

The binding character of the foreign judgment may be displaced only by establishing that the case falls within one or more of the six clauses of Section 13, and not otherwise. Further, it is the judgment which is conclusive and not the reasons.[4]The competence contemplated by Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is in an international sense, and not merely by the law of the foreign State in which the Court delivering judgment functions.[5]

One of the conditions contemplated under Section 13, for challenging the conclusiveness of foreign judgment, is the violation of natural justice. However, there would be no violation of natural justice when, on being served with notice, a party makes a choice as to not present itself before the court.[6] Interestingly, if one of the defendants dies and his legal representatives happen to be non-resident foreigners, then the court, where suit was initially initiated, would still be competent to try it.[7]

In cases related to child custody issues, a careful consideration should be given while determining the validity of a foreign decree.[8]Hence, in matters relating to matrimony and custody, the law of that place must govern which has the closest concern with the well-being of the spouses and the welfare of the off-springs of marriage.[9]

Supreme Court, in Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi,[10] laid down the rules in relation to the validity of foreign matrimonial judgements:

From the aforesaid discussion the following rule can be deduced for recognising a foreign matrimonial judgment in this country. The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows: (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.

Under Section 13(b), burden to prove that the decree is not on merits is on the person alleging it. However, courts, in such a situation, do not expect one to adduce impossible proofs.[11]We conclude this post thereby providing a brief overview of Section 13 of CPC.

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[1] Moloji Nar Singh Rao Shitole v. Shankar Saran, (1963) 2 SCR 577:AIR 1962 SC 1737

[2] R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, (1963) 3 SCR 22:AIR 1963 SC 1

[3] R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, (1963) 3 SCR 22:AIR 1963 SC 1

[4] Id

[5] Id

[6] Lalji Raja and Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram, (1971) 1 SCC 721; International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265

[7] Andhra Bank Ltd. v. Srinivasan, (1962) 3 SCR 391:AIR 1962 SC 232

[8] Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo, (2011) 6 SCC 479

[9] Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu, (1984) 3 SCC 698

[10] Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, (1991) 3 SCC 451, 462

[11] International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265

Section 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: An Overview and Analysis

Had it been possible for one to institute different suits, having identical subject matter, in different courts, the result would have been nothing less than a chaos. However, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), takes care of this problem. Section 10 of CPC provides that:

“No Court shall proceed......any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit......”

Under Section 10 of CPC, multiplicity of proceedings is intended to be avoided, i.e., for its application, the subject matter in a subsequent suit should be similar. Hence, Section 10 will not apply where a few of the matters in issue are common and will apply only when the entire subject-matter in controversy is same. In other words, the matter in issue is not equivalent to any of the questions in issue.[1]This proposition also finds support from the words "directly and substantially in issue", which have been used in contra-distinction to the words "incidentally or collaterally in issue" [Supreme Court].[2] As far as the word “matter in issue” is concerned, according to Delhi High Court, it means all disputed material questions in the subsequent suit which are directly and substantially in question in the previous suit.[3]Hence, according to the court, these are material questions which have to be looked into, and not any question. However, in another case, Delhi High Court held that it is not the identity of the main issue or some of the issues, but the identity of the matter which is the determining test.[4] In other words, it is not the identity of the cause of action but the matters in issue involved in the subsequent suit and the previous suit.[5]

According to the Supreme Court, Section 10 has been construed by the courts as not a bar to the passing of interlocutory orders such as an order for consolidation of the later suit with the earlier suit, or appointment of a Receiver or an injunction or attachment before judgment.[6]

Delhi High Court has, in Smt. Meena Bhandari v. Smt. Krishna Kumari & Ors,[7] after considering various judgments of the Supreme Court, laid down the following essential conditions for the applicability of Section 10 of CPC

Thus, there are four essential conditions for attracting the application of Section 10, C.P.C.

(1) That the matter in issue in the second suit is also directly and substantially in issue in the first suit; (2) that the parties in the second suit are the same or parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title; (3) that the Court in which the first suit is instituted is competent to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit; (4) that the previously instituted suit is pending (a) in the same Court in which the second suit is brought, or (b) in any Court in India, or (c) in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government, or (d) before the Supreme Court.

The object of Section 10 is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the same parties in respect of the same matter in issue.[8] The section enacts merely a rule of procedure and a decree passed in contravention thereof is not a nullity; hence, a court can decide relevant issues where a subsequently instituted suit can be decided on purely legal points without taking evidence.[9] The provisions of Section 10 do not become inapplicable on a Court holding that the previously instituted suit is a vexatious suit or has been instituted in violation of the terms of the contract.[10] Even in a situation when Section 10, C.P.C. does not strictly apply, for ends of justice, suit may be stayed under Section 151, C.P.C.[11]Interestingly, Section 10 is also applicable to the summary suits which are to be tried by the special procedure the laid down in Order XXXVII of the CPC.[12]

Delhi High Court has interpreted the decision of Supreme Court, in Gupte Cardiac Care Centre & Hospital vs. Olympic Pharma Care (P) Ltd,[13] thereby acknowledging that the test of 'directly and substantially in issue', as per Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is to see: whether the two suits arise out of the same transaction.[14] Section 10 cannot be interpreted to hold that since only proceeding with the trial of issue or suit is restricted by Section 10, C.P.C., therefore, it impliedly accepts maintainability of more than one suit by one plaintiff.[15]

For the application of Section 10, it is not sufficient that the parties are same or the subject-matter of the suits is same but the issues involved therein also should be same or substantially same and the relief which has been sought by the plaintiff in both the suits also should be substantially same.[16]

Delhi High Court has also differentiated between Section 10 & Section 11 of CPC, thereby holding that:

“The difference between section 10 and section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is well known. In section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure the matter in issue in the earlier instituted suit and the subsequently instituted suit should be directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit. Under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure mere pendency of the earlier suit which is not material but the civil suit should have been heard and finally decided between the parties.” [17]

As far as the applicability of explanation to Section 10, in relation to foreign courts, is concerned, Delhi High Court has held that:

“With due respect, we cannot concur with the reasoning that Explanation to Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would operate conversely to enable a foreign court to assume jurisdiction in respect of a cause of action which is pending adjudication in this country.”[18]

As we conclude this post, we are assuming that it would have been able to provide a brief analysis of Section of 10. In the next post, we shall write about the other provisions of CPC.

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[1] Aspi Jal v. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor, (2013) 4 SCC 333 at page 338

[2] National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256

[3] Sagar Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana and Anr v. The Union of India and Ors., AIR 1979 Delhi 118, (1979) ILR 1 Delhi 492

[4] Rajdhani Flour Mills Ltd. v.Uttam Agro Foods (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (66) DRJ 111

[5] Laxmi Fruit Co. v. Gainda Ram & Co., 1983 (4) DRJ 221, 1983 RLR 100

[6] Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd.,  AIR 1998 SC 1952

[7] 2000 1 AWC 786 All, 2000 91 RD 297

[8] National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256, 259; British Indian Corporation v. Rashtraco Freight Carriers, 1996 (4) SCC 748

[9]  Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna, (2004) 7 SCC 251 at page 254

[10] Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450:AIR 1962 SC 527

[11] Atul Chandra Bora v.  Assam Tea Brokers Pvt. Ltd., Gawahati, AIR 1995 Gau 73

[12] s:Maharashtra State Co-operative marketing Federation Ltd., Bombay v. Indian Bank, Bombay, AIR1 997 Bom 186, 1996 (2) MhLj 925

[13] Gupte Cardiac Care Centre & Hospital vs. Olympic Pharma Care (P) Ltd, (2004) 6 SCC 756

[14] Filo Interior Decorations Pvt. Ltd. V. L.K. Modi & Ors., FAO (OS) 650/2010 [Delhi High Court]

[15] Ranbir Singh v Balbir Singh, CS(OS) NO. 802 OF 2002 [Delhi High Court]

[16] Sairabi Sayyad Abdul Aziz deceased through her L.Rs. and Ors. v.  Abdul Rashid Abdul Majid, 2002 (3) BomCR 139

[17] Maxwell Securities Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. V. National Stock Exchange of India Limited, 2001 (60) DRJ 685

[18]Essel Sports Pvt. Ltd. (Indian Cricket League) v. Board of Control for Cricket in India and Ors., 178 (2011) DLT 465, 178 (2011) DLT 465, (2011) ILR 5 Delhi 585