Section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) provides for a
situation whereby a party, before the enforcement of an arbitral award, can
approach a court for interim measures.
For instance, interim measures can be sought against any goods which are the subject-matter of arbitration. Importance of such measures cannot be easily neglected,
especially when it affects the enforceability of the contingent arbitral award. Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”)
has, in the case of Bharat Aluminium Co.
v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.[1], held
that Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, by virtue of being in Part I, is
applicable where the place of arbitration is in India. Though the reasoning was
ambiguous, this has, for the time being, become the legal position.
Nature of Power under
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act
The court, under
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, is empowered to grant interim measures. Such
measures, as the language of the section suggests, can be granted even before
the commencement of arbitration proceedings. Since the measures are of "interim" character, a careful consideration is always required.
In Arvind Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Kalinga Mining Corpn.,[2] it was held by the court that exercise
of power under Section 9 of the Act must
be based on well-recognised principles governing the grant of interim
injunctions and other orders of interim protection or the appointment of a
Receiver. That is, it would not be correct to say that the power under Section
9 of the Act is totally independent of the well-known principles of interim
injunctions.[3]As
regard the applicability of Specific Relief Act, 1963 to an application, under
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, it was held by the Supreme Court, in Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and
Minerals (P) Ltd.,[4]
that:
“When the grant of relief by way of
injunction is, in general, governed by the Specific Relief Act, and Section 9
of the Act provides for an approach to the court for an interim injunction, we
wonder how the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act can be kept out
of consideration.”
