Expiry of Limitation Period Does not Extinguish Usufructuary Mortgagor's Right to Recover Possession

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) has recently, in Singh Ram (D) Thr. L.Rs. v. Sheo Ram &Ors., held that for the purpose of Article 61 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”), limitation period for ‘usufructuary mortgagor’ to recover mortgaged property starts when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor.

The controversy in the present appeal (clubbed in several other appeals) involved a suit property, mortgaged by the predecessor of the Respondents to the predecessor of the Appellants in 1903. As the property was not redeemed even after a period of ‘60 years’, the Appellant-Plaintiffs filed a suit for a declaration that the Respondent-Defendants had lost rights over the property; as a consequence, the former had become ‘owners by prescription’. In other words, it was the contention that the mortgagor, as a result of the expiration of limitation period, i.e., 60 years, had lost their right to seek redemption of the property. [Under the Old Limitation Act, 1908, limitation period under Article 148 (Schedule I; right to redeem mortgaged property) was 60 years; however, under the Limitation Act (1963), it has been reduced down to 30 years under Article 61 of the Schedule]

The trial court did not accept the content(s) of the Appellants and held that in cases of ‘usufructuary mortgage’, limitation starts from the date when mortgagee demands the money and mortgagor refuses the same. The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the first appellate court and the High Court (second appellate court). While affirming the decision, the High Court made the following observations:

(i)                Mortgage  is essentially and basically a conveyance in law or an assignment  of  chattels  as  a  security  for  the payment  of  debt  or  for  discharge  of  some  other obligations for which it is given.

(ii)             The mortgagee remains in possession  of  the  mortgaged  property;  enjoys  the usufruct thereof and, therefore, not to lose anything by  returning  the  security  on  receipt  of  mortgage debt.

(iii)           § 62 of  the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("Property Act")  is  a  special  provision  dealing  only  with the  rights  of  usufructuary  mortgagor.

(iv)            Right of foreclosure  will  not  accrue  to  the  mortgagee  till such time the mortgagee remains in possession of the  mortgaged  security  and  is  appropriating usufruct of the mortgaged land towards the interest on  the  mortgaged  debt.

(v)              The mortgage cannot be extinguished by any unilateral act of the mortgagee.

Gift of Property under Muslim Law cannot be Conditional but Absolute

In a recent decision [V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani (D) by L.Rs. v. Shaik Abdul Rahim & Anr], the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) has had the occasion to deal with an intricate question under Muslim Succession Law – whether there can be a conditional gift of a (immovable) property? In 1952, Sheikh Hussein gifted a ‘titled house’ (through an executed gift deed) to his wife, Banu Bibi. It was stipulated in the deed that Banu Bibi would enjoy the property during her lifetime and would not alienate it. However, the property could devolve in favour of her off spring after her death, and in case she does not have any children, the property would be returned back to Hussein or his near successors. Notwithstanding the conditions under the deed, Banu Bibi sold the house in 1978 to V. Sreeramachandra Avadhani (Appellant – represented by his Legal Representatives). Consequently after Banu Bibi’s death, the Respondents (Shaik Abdul Rahim and Abdul Gaffor) staked claim over impugned house on the ground that, (i) Babu Bibi only had a ‘life interest’ in the property and could not have alienated it, and (ii) being legal representatives of Sheikh Hussein, right and title over the property came to be vested on them.

Principal Senior Civil Judge dismissed Respondents’ claim for the reason that since the gift deed was not in nature of usufruct, the gifted property came to be ‘irrevocably’ vested on Babu Bibi. As such, the conditions in the gift deed, limiting her rights, were void [Relied on: Nawazish  Ali Khan  v. Ali  Raza Khan, AIR 1948  PC 34]. Against this order, the Respondent filed first appeal. While reversing the order of Senior Civil Judge, the First Appellate Court relied on the ‘text’ of the gift deed that had limited the rights of Banu Bibi and had provided that the property would be returned back to Hussein or his near successors. Dissatisfied with the judgement of First Appellate Court, the Appellant filed an appeal before the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh (“High Court”). Appellant did not get any relief and the High Court, again relying on the text of the gift deed, affirmed the First Appellate Court’s order.

The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Bill, 2013

[Note: Author and Contributor of this blog post is Risabh A. Gupta, 3rd Year Student, B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), National Law University, Odisha. He can be contacted at rishabh.a.09@gmail.com] 

The Real Estate Regulation and Development Bill, 2013 has been approved by the Union Cabinet on June 4, 2013 after much delay and deliberation. The bill has yet to be approved by the Parliament i.e, Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. After this, the bill would become statute once it receives the presidential assent. Separate Real Estate Bills have been formulated by Maharashtra and Haryana State Governments. Therefore, when enacted, the Central Act would prevail over any State legislation and any provisions repugnant to the Central Act would be void. 

The Bill is aimed at regulating the largely unregulated real estate housing sector. It envisages the creation of a Real Estate Regulatory Authority [hereinafter “Authority”] and an Appellate Tribunal which would act as a watchdog for the housing sector, predominantly towards safeguarding and protecting consumer interests. Also, creation of the tribunals would act as an effective redress mechanism for any disputes. 

The Real Estate Bill envisages providing effective and efficient regulatory framework and environment in the real estate sector which is laced with illegal and black money, corruption, land mafias and red tapism. 

Preliminary Decree - Not Sufficient for the Partition of a Hindu Joint Property

Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“Act”) in the year 2005 turned to be an enabling provision for women by providing them with the rights over the ancestral property, which for long period of time was denied to them. Section 6 of the Act was amended so as for this purpose which provided rights to daughters equivalent to those of a sons in a family property by virtue of their birth. But, it shall be noted here that act so amended cannot be applied to the partitions or property arrangements executed before the commencement of the act. Statement of Objects and reason of the amendment act, if read carefully, will aptly connote that the said amendment to the act was indeed carried out because disallowing women from claiming any kind of share in the property was behaving as a discriminatory provision against the women. In other words, it was a gender biased provision. The date on which this amended act came into force was September 9, 2005.

Some of the ways by means of which a Hindu Joint Property can be divided are a registered instrument of a partition, and a decree of the court. In the former case, sometimes it becomes difficult to conclude at what stage of the trail a decree of the court can be considered to be sufficient for the final partition of a Hindu Joint Property. In other words, whether preliminary decree can be considered to be sufficient enough for the partition of a Hindu Joint Property? This question has recently been addressed by the Supreme Court in Ganduri Koteshwaramma & Ors v. Chakiri Yanadi & Ors Civil Appeal No. 8538 of 2011, where issue as regards the rights of the daughters/appellants under the amended act had come before the court.

Preliminary decree had been passed by the trial court in the year 1999, at a time when the impugned act was not amended by the legislature. Before the final decree passed, the act was amended in the year 2005 thereby conferring rights over the appellant on in the piece of property which they had not been holding any kind of share earlier. The same amendment was allowed by the trail court and the final decree was made only after taking into consideration the amended act. In the meantime, Sons/Respondent preferred an appeal before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, and interestingly High Court reversed the decree of trial court, and further high court was of the view that final decree shall always be in conformity with the preliminary decree after taking into consideration Order XX Rule 18 of CPC. Eventually, the matter came before the Supreme Court by means of a civil appeal.

Supreme Court aptly discussed the issue as regards the substance which one should provide to the preliminary decree. Court held that a suit for partition cannot said to have been disposed off only by means of a preliminary decree, and the same shall stand to be concluded only when the final decree has been passed. Further Court was of the opinion that the same preliminary decree can be amended as many times as court wants to amend before the final , and no provision under Civil Procedure can said to be a deterrent to the same. Court, while opining this, relied on the case of Phoolchand and Anr. Vs. Gopal Lal [AIR 1967 SC 1470], wherein it had been held by the court that –

"We are of opinion that there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree if circumstances justify the same and that it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die and shares of other parties are thereby augmented. . . . .. So far therefore as partition suits are concerned we have no doubt that if an event transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates a change in shares, the court can and should do so; ........... there is no prohibition in the Code of Civil Procedure against passing a second preliminary decree in such circumstances and we do not see why we should rule out a second preliminary decree in such circumstances only on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate such a possibility. . . for it must not be forgotten that the suit is not over till the final decree is passed and the court has jurisdiction to decide all disputes that may arise after the preliminary decree, particularly in a partition suit due to deaths of some of the parties. . . . .a second preliminary decree can be passed in partition suits by which the shares allotted in the preliminary decree already passed can be amended and if there is dispute between surviving parties in that behalf and that dispute is decided the decision amounts to a decree.... ............"

Court also relied on the case of S. Sai Reddy vs. S. Narayana Reddy and Others [(1991) 3 SCC 647 11], wherein it had been held by the court that

“Unless and until the final decree is passed and the allottees of the shares are put in possession of the respective property, the partition is not complete”.

Eventually, court in this case, while appreciating the fact that this amended act shall not be applied to the partitions which had already been executed before this amended act, Court allowed the appeal.

Registered Deed of Conveyance - Only Valid form to transfer an Immovable Property

The abuse of General Power of Attorney Sales (“GPA Sales”) or Sale Agreement/General Power of Attorney/Will Transfers (“SA/GPA/WILL”) has come before the notice of the Supreme Court recently in the case of Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana wherein it has been held by the Court that transfer made by any of the means mentioned above does not transfer any kind of interest whatsoever as long as they are not duly registered. These kinds of sales, according the court, promotes sham sale of land and also furthers land mafia. Court further made it clear that such transaction shall not be confused with the genuine transfers made under By an earlier order of this case Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt.Ltd. vs. State of Haryana & Anr. - 2009 (7) SCC 363, court opined the ill-effects which these transactions can entail. Court in this earlier order had held that –

“Recourse to `SA/GPA/WILL' transactions is taken in regard to freehold properties, even when there is no bar or prohibition regarding transfer or conveyance of such property, by the following categories of persons:

(a) Vendors with imperfect title who cannot or do not want to execute registered deeds of conveyance.

(b) Purchasers who want to invest undisclosed wealth/income in immovable properties without any public record of the transactions. The process enables them to hold any number of properties without disclosing them as assets held.

(c) Purchasers who want to avoid the payment of stamp duty and registration charges either deliberately or on wrong advice. Persons who deal in real estate resort to these methods to avoid multiple stamp duties/registration fees so as to increase their profit margin.”

Court clarified that these transaction leads to the evasion of income tax, wealth tax, stamp duty because of which a huge amount of loss has to be incurred by the state. State is not able to impose any of these taxes simply because of the reason that it is not possible, under these transactions, to indentify the real owner of the property in dispute because of the lack of the registration. Further, it has been argued by the court that these transactions are being used by several persons in order to hide black money. Further, it endangers the genuine purchaser since the vendor can again sell the same piece of property to some other person in return of consideration. In addition, court was of the view that it is used by the land mafia as a means to gain the property from a genuine purchaser by means of threat or force. Court, in this case, asked Gopal Subramaniam, former Solicitor General of India, for his view on the instant matter and he complied with the same. It has further been found out that those with ulterior motives either to indulge in black money transactions or land mafia continue to favour such transactions. It is very important to note here that registration is mandatory in cases where conveyance of the property is made, and this is the reason why no other form of transaction will be valid except where conveyance is made along with a registered deed.

Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“The Act”) defined what one can mean by the term “transfer of property”. Section 54 of the act stipulates the explanation of the term “sale”, and further signified how a sale shall be made. Section 53A of the act defines what is meant by part performance and the conditions under which a transferee would be able to save himself in case he has performed the imperative stipulations of the agreement to sell. It shall be noted here that agreement not in itself creates any interest in favour of the transferee.

Court further, while referring to its earlier judgment Suraj Lamp (Supra) in relation to the essence of registration, stated that –

"The Registration Act, 1908, was enacted with the intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to transactions relating to immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of transfer. This is achieved by requiring compulsory registration of certain types of documents and providing for consequences of non-registration. Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly provides that any document (other than testamentary instruments) which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future "any right, title or interest" whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards to or in immovable property. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person/s presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified.

To support the view that agreement to sale does not in itself create any interest over the property, court relied on the judgments of Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and Anr. (1977) 3 SCC 247, Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazra [1967]1 SCR 293 and Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra [2004 (8) SCC 614]. Court in the instance case added that contract of sale which is not registered would fall short of the requirements of sections 54 and 55 of TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property. In the case of GPA, court was of the view that it is usually executed between a principal and an agent under which certain powers are conferred over the agent by the principal to act on his behalf. Court opined that under this power, agents can surely a deed of conveyance. On the issue of will, court held that it is the transfer of property between the living humans because it only comes into existence after the death of the testator, and testator has the power to alter the will during his lifetime and the same cannot be considered as a valid transfer of property. Eventually court, while concluding the case stated that –

“We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of `GPA sales' or `SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53A of the TP Act”

Landmark Judgment - Supreme Court recommends Abolition of Adverse Possession

An important and extremely significant question has come before the Supreme Court recently in the case of State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar & Ors., where the issue ought to be resolved was -

"whether the State, which is in charge of protection of life, liberty and property of the people can be permitted to grab the land and property of its own citizens under the banner of the plea of adverse possession?"

In the instant case, recommendations have been made by the Supreme Court as regards abolition of the provision related to Adverse Possession, and if not that, the same should be amended.

Adverse possession, in its general sense, entitles a person to claim title over the property which does not belong to him when certain stipulations are satisfied. And, the same possession is authorised under the law. In the present case, a suit was filed by the state of Haryana ("State") in a civil court claiming the adverse possession over the property of the respondent ("Defendant" in the original suit. It was alleged 0n behalf of the defendant that the property, contrary to what was claimed by the state ("Respondent" in the present Special Leave Petition, and "Plaintiff" in the Original Suit), was not under the possession of the plaintiff for last 55 years and the same has been acquired by use of force. Trial Court found the claim of the plaintiff false, and thereby decreed in favour of the defendant. Further, the day on which possession became adverse was not mentioned by the plaintiff in the plea, and trial court finding this point important relied on S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina AIR 1964 SC 1254, wherein it had been held by the Supreme Court that

adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse. The Court also held that long possession is not necessarily adverse possession

Trial Court further opined that since no adverse possession could be proved by the plaintiff, it has no locus standi in the impugned suit. Appeal against the order of trial court was filed in the court of Addl. District Judge, who while dismissing the appeal relied on the decisions of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Bhim Singh & Ors. v Zile Singh & Ors., AIR 2006 P and H 195 and Kanak Ram & Ors. v. Chanan Singh & Ors. (2007) 146 PLR 498 wherein it was held that a person in adverse possession of immovable property cannot file a suit for declaration claiming ownership and such a suit was not maintainable. Consequently, a second appeal was filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court by the plaintiff, and High Court while dismissing the appeal was of the opinion that the state which is responsible for the protection of life and property of its citizens, is itself trying to grab the land of the defendant under the blanket of adverse possession.

Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal discussed the historical background of the Adverse Possession, and also discussed the article of Neveda Law Journal, Making Sense Out of Nonsense: A Response to Adverse Possession by Governmental Entities' by Andrew Dickal. In the meantime, Supreme Court discussed its decision in In Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan and Others (2009) 16 SCC 517(Para 24 and 26 to 29) -

24. In a relatively recent case in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007) 6 SCC 59, this Court again had an occasion to deal with the concept of adverse possession in detail. The Court also examined the legal position in various countries particularly in English and American systems. We deem it appropriate to reproduce relevant passages in extenso. The Court dealing with adverse possession in paras 5 and 6 observed as under: (SCC pp. 66-67)

5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. (See Downing v. Bird 100 So 2d 57 (Fla 1958), Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock 227, Ark 1085 : 303 SW 2d 569 (1957); Monnot v. Murphy 207 NY 240 : 100 NE 742 (1913); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm 39 Wyo 494 : 273 P 908 : 97 ALR 1 (1929).)

6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depends on strong limitation statutes by operation of which right to access the court expires through efflux of time. As against rights of the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one's right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or colour of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, p. 81. It is important to keep in mind while studying the American notion of adverse possession, especially in the backdrop of limitation statutes, that the intention to dispossess cannot be given a complete go-by. Simple application of limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim.

26. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession in the recent judgment of JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom (2005) 49 ERG 90 which concerned the loss of ownership of land by virtue of adverse possession. In the said case, the applicant company was the registered owner of a plot of 23 hectares of agricultural land. The owners of a property adjacent to the land, Mr and Mrs Graham (the Grahams) occupied the land under a grazing agreement. After a brief exchange of documents in December 1983 a chartered surveyor acting for the applicants wrote to the Grahams noting that the grazing agreement was about to expire and requiring them to vacate the land. The Grahams continued to use the whole of the disputed land for farming without the permission of the applicants from September 1998 till 1999. In 1997, Mr Graham moved the Local Land Registry against the applicant on the ground that he had obtained title by adverse possession. The Grahams challenged the applicant company's claims under the Limitation Act, 1980 (the 1980 Act) which provides that a person cannot bring an action to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years of adverse possession by another.

27. The judgment was pronounced in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham (2000) 3 WLR 242 : 2000 Ch 676. The Court held in favour of the Grahams but went on to observe the irony in law of adverse possession. The court observed that the law which provides to oust an owner on the basis of inaction of 12 years is illogical and disproportionate. The effect of such law would seem draconian to the owner and a windfall for the squatter. The court expressed its astonishment on the prevalent law that ousting an owner for not taking action within limitation is illogical. The applicant company aggrieved by the said judgment filed an appeal and the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court decision. The Grahams then appealed to the House of Lords, which, allowed their appeal and restored the order of the High Court.

28. The House of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham (2003) 1 AC 419 : (2002) 3 WLR 221 : (2002) 3 All ER 865 (HL), observed that the Grahams had possession of the land in the ordinary sense of the word, and, therefore, the applicant company had been dispossessed of it within the meaning of the Limitation Act of 1980.

29. We deem it proper to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma (2007) 6 SCC 59: (SCC p. 79, paras 51-52)

51.Thereafter the applicants moved the European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) alleging that the United Kingdom law on adverse possession, by which they lost land 2to a neighbour, operated in violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (`the Convention').

52. It was contended by the applicants that they had been deprived of their land by the operation of the domestic law on adverse possession which is in contravention with Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (`the Convention'), which reads as under:

`Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possession. No one shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.'

This Court in Revamma case also mentioned that the European Council of Human Rights importantly laid down three-pronged test to judge the interference of the Government with the right of peaceful enjoyment of property (SCC p. 79, para 53)

53. ... [In] Beyeler v. Italy [GC] No. 33202 of 1996 '' 108-14 ECHR 2000-I, it was held that the `interference' should comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a legitimate aim (public interest) by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.The Court observed:(Revamma case 79-80, paras 54-56)

54. ... `The question nevertheless remains whether, even having regard to the lack of care and inadvertence on the part of the applicants and their advisers, the deprivation of their title to the registered land and the transfer of beneficial ownership to those in unauthorized possession struck a fair balance with any legitimate public interest served.In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the application of the provisions of the 1925 and 1980 Acts to deprive the applicant companies of their title to the registered land imposed on them an individual and excessive burden and upset the fair balance between the demands of the public interest on the one hand and the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions on the other. There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1.'

55. The question of the application of Article 41 was referred for the Grand Chamber Hearing of the ECHR. This case sets the field of adverse possession and its interface with the right to peaceful enjoyment in all its complexity.

56. Therefore it will have to be kept in mind the courts around the world are taking an unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights.

Supreme Court further stated that Right to property is not only a constitutional right, but also it has been considered as a human Right (Beaulane Properties Ltd. v. Palmer (2005) 3 WLR 554 Discussed). Supreme Court recommend the abolition of the concept of Adverse Possession, or at least the same shall be amended by the parliament and make the requirement of at least 30-50 years. Adverse possession is being claimed intentionally by the person who does not have any kind of right whatsoever over the property. Important portion of the judgement where Supreme Court made recommendations can be read as -

42. We inherited this law of adverse possession from the British. The Parliament may consider abolishing the law of adverse possession or at least amending and making substantial changes in law in the larger public interest. The Government instrumentalities - including the police - in the instant case have attempted to possess land adversely. This, in our opinion, a testament to the absurdity of the law and a black mark upon the justice system's legitimacy. The Government should protect the property of a citizen - not steal it. And yet, as the law currently stands, they may do just that. If this law is to be retained, according to the wisdom of the Parliament, then at least the law must require those who adversely possess land to compensate title owners according to the prevalent market rate of the land or property in question. This alternative would provide some semblance of justice to those who have done nothing other than sitting on their rights for the statutory period, while allowing the adverse possessor to remain on property. While it may be indefensible to require all adverse possessors - some of whom may be poor - to pay market rates for the land they possess, perhaps some lesser amount would be realistic in most of the cases. The Parliament may either fix a set range of rates or to leave it to the judiciary with the option of choosing from within a set range of rates so as to tailor the compensation to the equities of a given case.

43. The Parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish bad faith adverse possession, i.e., adverse possession achieved through intentional trespassing. Actually believing it to be their own could receive title through adverse possession sends a wrong signal to the society at large. Such a change would ensure that only those who had established attachments to the land through honest means would be entitled to legal relief.

44. In case, the Parliament decides to retain the law of adverse possession, the Parliament might simply require adverse possession claimants to possess the property in question for a period of 30 to 50 years, rather than a mere 12. Such an extension would help to ensure that successful claimants have lived on the land for generations, and are therefore less likely to be individually culpable for the trespass (although their forebears might). A longer statutory period would also decrease the frequency of adverse possession suits and ensure that only those claimants most intimately connected with the land acquire it, while only the most passive and unprotective owners lose title.

Eventually, Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court