Conclusiveness of “Foreign Judgment” under Section 13, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) provides that a foreign judgment, which directly adjudicates a matter between two parties, shall be conclusive as far as that matter is concerned. However, Section 13 also provides for the conditions which, if satisfied, will affect the conclusiveness of the judgment. In total, six conditions have been stipulated under the section.

At the outset, it should be understood that the rules provided under Section 13 of CPC are rules of substantive law and not merely of procedure.[1] The expression “matter” in Section 13 is not equivalent to subject-matter: it means the right claimed.[2]While determining the validity of a foreign judgement, it should also be noted that a court of a foreign country has no jurisdiction to deliver a judgment capable of enforcement, or recognition in another country in any proceeding the subject-matter of which is title to immovable property outside that country.[3]Hence, a foreign decree, related to the title of an immovable property, may not be enforceable.

The binding character of the foreign judgment may be displaced only by establishing that the case falls within one or more of the six clauses of Section 13, and not otherwise. Further, it is the judgment which is conclusive and not the reasons.[4]The competence contemplated by Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is in an international sense, and not merely by the law of the foreign State in which the Court delivering judgment functions.[5]

One of the conditions contemplated under Section 13, for challenging the conclusiveness of foreign judgment, is the violation of natural justice. However, there would be no violation of natural justice when, on being served with notice, a party makes a choice as to not present itself before the court.[6] Interestingly, if one of the defendants dies and his legal representatives happen to be non-resident foreigners, then the court, where suit was initially initiated, would still be competent to try it.[7]

In cases related to child custody issues, a careful consideration should be given while determining the validity of a foreign decree.[8]Hence, in matters relating to matrimony and custody, the law of that place must govern which has the closest concern with the well-being of the spouses and the welfare of the off-springs of marriage.[9]

Supreme Court, in Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi,[10] laid down the rules in relation to the validity of foreign matrimonial judgements:

From the aforesaid discussion the following rule can be deduced for recognising a foreign matrimonial judgment in this country. The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may be as follows: (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.

Under Section 13(b), burden to prove that the decree is not on merits is on the person alleging it. However, courts, in such a situation, do not expect one to adduce impossible proofs.[11]We conclude this post thereby providing a brief overview of Section 13 of CPC.

---

[1] Moloji Nar Singh Rao Shitole v. Shankar Saran, (1963) 2 SCR 577:AIR 1962 SC 1737

[2] R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, (1963) 3 SCR 22:AIR 1963 SC 1

[3] R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, (1963) 3 SCR 22:AIR 1963 SC 1

[4] Id

[5] Id

[6] Lalji Raja and Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram, (1971) 1 SCC 721; International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265

[7] Andhra Bank Ltd. v. Srinivasan, (1962) 3 SCR 391:AIR 1962 SC 232

[8] Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo, (2011) 6 SCC 479

[9] Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu, (1984) 3 SCC 698

[10] Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, (1991) 3 SCC 451, 462

[11] International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265

Environmental Jurisprudence and the Supreme Court: Part I [“Precautionary Principle” and "Polluter Pays Principle"]

As promised in one of our last posts, we herein discuss two significant principles, i.e, “Precautionary Principle” and “Polluter Pays Principle”, which have immensely affected the environmental jurisprudence in India. Referring to the importance of these two principles, Justice Kuldip Singh, in Vellore Citizen’s Welfare Forum v. Union of India,[1]  held that:

“In view of the above-mentioned constitutional and statutory provisions we have no hesitation in holding that the Precautionary Principle and the Polluter Pays Principle are part of the environmental law of the country.”

(Source: The American Magazine)

Vellore Citizen’s Welfare Forum has been a landmark judgement for broadening and explaining the importance of these principles. Section 20 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (“NGT Act”),[2] specifies that the Tribunal, while passing orders, shall apply the precautionary principle and polluter pays principle. The enactment of NGT Act is preceded by an inclination of the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) towards these two principles which, in effect, have become part of the law of the land.[3]

The precautionary principle suggests that where there is an identifiable risk of serious or irreversible harm, including, for example, extinction of species, widespread toxic pollution in major threats to essential ecological processes, it may be appropriate to place the burden of proof on the person or entity proposing the activity that is potentially harmful to the environment.[4]Principle 15 of Rio Conference of 1992 relating to the applicability of precautionary principle stipulates that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for proposing effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.[5]

In Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. Sri. C. Kenchappa and Ors., Supreme Court, while explaining that ‘precautionary principle’ and ‘polluter pays principle’ are part of the law of land, referred to some foreign sources.[6]For instance, it referred to the Article 7 of the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, Australian Conservation Foundation etc. Precautionary principle requires anticipatory action to be taken to prevent harm.[7]That is, in view of the precautionary principle as defined by the Supreme Court, the environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation.[8]

In Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India and Others,[9] Supreme Court held that:

“the 'precautionary principle' and the corresponding burden of proof on the person who wants to change the status quo will ordinarily apply in a case of polluting or other project or industry where the extent of damage likely to be inflicted is not known.”

In other words, if one, who seeks to change status quo of the environment, provides insufficient evidence to alleviate concern about the level of uncertainity, then the presumption should operate in favour of environmental protection.[10]Precautionary principle, along with polluter pays principles, is also part of the concept of "sustainable development" and has to be followed by the State Governments in controlling pollution.[11]Supreme Court has also held that these principles flow from the core value in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.[12]

(Source: Google Images)

Polluter Pays Principle, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, means that the absolute liability for harm to the environment extends not only to compensate the victims of pollution but also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation.[13]In other words, producer of goods or other items should be responsible for the cost of preventing or dealing with any pollution that the process causes.[14]Pollution is a civil wrong, that too against the society. Because of this, a person, who harms the environment, has to pay damages for the restoration of environment and ecology.[15] Polluter Pays Principles is now widely accepted as a means of paying for the cost of pollution and control.[16]

From above judicial precedents, it is clear that both the precautionary principles and polluter pays principles have attained a significant position in Indian environmental jurisprudence. In the next post, we shall discuss more about the role of Supreme Court in environmental jurisprudence in India.

---

[1] Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India and others, ( 1996 ) 5 SCC 647

[2] Act No. 19 of 2010

[3] S. Jagannath  v. Union of India and others, (1997) 2 SCC 87; Tirupur Dyeing Factory Owners Association Vs. Noyyal River Ayacutdars Protection Association and Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 737

[4] Report of Dr. Sreenivasa Rao Pemmaraju, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, dated 3.4,1998, para 61 [As mentioned in A.P. Pollution Control Board (I) v. Prof. M. V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718]

[5]Principle 15, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992; Research Foundation for Science Technology and Natural Resources Policy v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr., (2005) 10 SCC 510

[6] Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. Sri. C. Kenchappa and Ors (2006) 6 SCC 371

[7] M.C. Mehta Vs.  Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2004) 12 SCC 118

[8] M.C. Mehta Vs.  Union of India (UOI) and Ors, AIR 1997 SC 734

[9] Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India and Others, (2000) 10 SCC 664

[10] A.P. Pollution Control Board (I) v. Prof. M. V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718

[11] In Re Suo Motu Proceedings, Delhi Transport Department, (1998) 9 SCC 250; M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, (2005) 10 SCC 217; Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Vs. Sri. C. Kenchappa and Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 371

[12] Court on Its Own Motion Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., 2012 (6) SCALE 607; Govt. of A.P. and Ors.Vs. Obulapuram Minig. Company P. Ltd. and Ors. etc., (2011) 12 SCC4 91; Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd. V. The State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 10 SCC 96

[13]Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action and Ors.Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 212; Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd. Vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group and Ors., (2006) 3 SCC 434; : Deepak Nitrite Ltd. Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2004) 6 SCC 402

[14] Research Foundation for Science Technology and Natural Resources Policy Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2005) 10 SCC 510

[15] State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors, (2010) 3 SCC 402

[16] M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and Ors., (2000) 6 SCC 213

Section 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: An Overview and Analysis

Had it been possible for one to institute different suits, having identical subject matter, in different courts, the result would have been nothing less than a chaos. However, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), takes care of this problem. Section 10 of CPC provides that:

“No Court shall proceed......any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit......”

Under Section 10 of CPC, multiplicity of proceedings is intended to be avoided, i.e., for its application, the subject matter in a subsequent suit should be similar. Hence, Section 10 will not apply where a few of the matters in issue are common and will apply only when the entire subject-matter in controversy is same. In other words, the matter in issue is not equivalent to any of the questions in issue.[1]This proposition also finds support from the words "directly and substantially in issue", which have been used in contra-distinction to the words "incidentally or collaterally in issue" [Supreme Court].[2] As far as the word “matter in issue” is concerned, according to Delhi High Court, it means all disputed material questions in the subsequent suit which are directly and substantially in question in the previous suit.[3]Hence, according to the court, these are material questions which have to be looked into, and not any question. However, in another case, Delhi High Court held that it is not the identity of the main issue or some of the issues, but the identity of the matter which is the determining test.[4] In other words, it is not the identity of the cause of action but the matters in issue involved in the subsequent suit and the previous suit.[5]

According to the Supreme Court, Section 10 has been construed by the courts as not a bar to the passing of interlocutory orders such as an order for consolidation of the later suit with the earlier suit, or appointment of a Receiver or an injunction or attachment before judgment.[6]

Delhi High Court has, in Smt. Meena Bhandari v. Smt. Krishna Kumari & Ors,[7] after considering various judgments of the Supreme Court, laid down the following essential conditions for the applicability of Section 10 of CPC

Thus, there are four essential conditions for attracting the application of Section 10, C.P.C.

(1) That the matter in issue in the second suit is also directly and substantially in issue in the first suit; (2) that the parties in the second suit are the same or parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title; (3) that the Court in which the first suit is instituted is competent to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit; (4) that the previously instituted suit is pending (a) in the same Court in which the second suit is brought, or (b) in any Court in India, or (c) in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government, or (d) before the Supreme Court.

The object of Section 10 is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the same parties in respect of the same matter in issue.[8] The section enacts merely a rule of procedure and a decree passed in contravention thereof is not a nullity; hence, a court can decide relevant issues where a subsequently instituted suit can be decided on purely legal points without taking evidence.[9] The provisions of Section 10 do not become inapplicable on a Court holding that the previously instituted suit is a vexatious suit or has been instituted in violation of the terms of the contract.[10] Even in a situation when Section 10, C.P.C. does not strictly apply, for ends of justice, suit may be stayed under Section 151, C.P.C.[11]Interestingly, Section 10 is also applicable to the summary suits which are to be tried by the special procedure the laid down in Order XXXVII of the CPC.[12]

Delhi High Court has interpreted the decision of Supreme Court, in Gupte Cardiac Care Centre & Hospital vs. Olympic Pharma Care (P) Ltd,[13] thereby acknowledging that the test of 'directly and substantially in issue', as per Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is to see: whether the two suits arise out of the same transaction.[14] Section 10 cannot be interpreted to hold that since only proceeding with the trial of issue or suit is restricted by Section 10, C.P.C., therefore, it impliedly accepts maintainability of more than one suit by one plaintiff.[15]

For the application of Section 10, it is not sufficient that the parties are same or the subject-matter of the suits is same but the issues involved therein also should be same or substantially same and the relief which has been sought by the plaintiff in both the suits also should be substantially same.[16]

Delhi High Court has also differentiated between Section 10 & Section 11 of CPC, thereby holding that:

“The difference between section 10 and section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is well known. In section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure the matter in issue in the earlier instituted suit and the subsequently instituted suit should be directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit. Under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure mere pendency of the earlier suit which is not material but the civil suit should have been heard and finally decided between the parties.” [17]

As far as the applicability of explanation to Section 10, in relation to foreign courts, is concerned, Delhi High Court has held that:

“With due respect, we cannot concur with the reasoning that Explanation to Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would operate conversely to enable a foreign court to assume jurisdiction in respect of a cause of action which is pending adjudication in this country.”[18]

As we conclude this post, we are assuming that it would have been able to provide a brief analysis of Section of 10. In the next post, we shall write about the other provisions of CPC.

---

[1] Aspi Jal v. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor, (2013) 4 SCC 333 at page 338

[2] National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256

[3] Sagar Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana and Anr v. The Union of India and Ors., AIR 1979 Delhi 118, (1979) ILR 1 Delhi 492

[4] Rajdhani Flour Mills Ltd. v.Uttam Agro Foods (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (66) DRJ 111

[5] Laxmi Fruit Co. v. Gainda Ram & Co., 1983 (4) DRJ 221, 1983 RLR 100

[6] Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd.,  AIR 1998 SC 1952

[7] 2000 1 AWC 786 All, 2000 91 RD 297

[8] National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256, 259; British Indian Corporation v. Rashtraco Freight Carriers, 1996 (4) SCC 748

[9]  Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna, (2004) 7 SCC 251 at page 254

[10] Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450:AIR 1962 SC 527

[11] Atul Chandra Bora v.  Assam Tea Brokers Pvt. Ltd., Gawahati, AIR 1995 Gau 73

[12] s:Maharashtra State Co-operative marketing Federation Ltd., Bombay v. Indian Bank, Bombay, AIR1 997 Bom 186, 1996 (2) MhLj 925

[13] Gupte Cardiac Care Centre & Hospital vs. Olympic Pharma Care (P) Ltd, (2004) 6 SCC 756

[14] Filo Interior Decorations Pvt. Ltd. V. L.K. Modi & Ors., FAO (OS) 650/2010 [Delhi High Court]

[15] Ranbir Singh v Balbir Singh, CS(OS) NO. 802 OF 2002 [Delhi High Court]

[16] Sairabi Sayyad Abdul Aziz deceased through her L.Rs. and Ors. v.  Abdul Rashid Abdul Majid, 2002 (3) BomCR 139

[17] Maxwell Securities Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. V. National Stock Exchange of India Limited, 2001 (60) DRJ 685

[18]Essel Sports Pvt. Ltd. (Indian Cricket League) v. Board of Control for Cricket in India and Ors., 178 (2011) DLT 465, 178 (2011) DLT 465, (2011) ILR 5 Delhi 585

Jurisdiction of National Green Tribunal: Matters it can adjudicate; Principles it shall apply

In order to ensure that cases pertaining to environmental protection, conservation of forests etc. are adjudicated speedily, Parliament of India (“Parliament”), in the year 2010, enacted The National Green Tribunal Act (“NGT Act”). The NGT Act was enacted for ensuring that a tribunal, dealing specifically with environmental related matters, is established. Emphasising the importance of the NGT Act, Supreme Court, in Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan v. Union of India[1], held that in order for an expeditious disposal of environmental related matters, as also to avoid any conflict between the orders of the National Green Tribunal (“Tribunal”) and High Courts, all the matters covered under Schedule I of the NGT Act should be instituted and litigated before the Tribunal.

Image Courtesy: Odisha Reporter

Section 14 of the NGT Act provides that the Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment is involved, and such question arises out of the enactments specified in Schedule I. Schedule I of the NGT Act contains a list of seven legislations viz. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1977, The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, The Environment (Protection Act) Act, 1986, The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 and The Biological Diversity Act, 2002. Hence, as long as a substantial civil cause of action arises out of any of these Acts, an applicant can approach the Tribunal. Locus Standi, in such cases, should be determined by also taking into account respective legislations. Under Section 14 of the NGT Act, unless an applicant was prevented by a sufficient cause, he has to file the application for adjudication before the Tribunal within six months from the date on which cause of action first arose. What is clear from the language of Section 14 is that it is not every civil cause of action, arising out of the above-mentioned legislations, that can be brought before the Tribunal. Instead, the same shall involve a “substantial question relating to environment”.

Moving further, Section 16 of the NGT confers on the Tribunal appellate powers against certain orders [See Section 16 for the list of such orders]. Hence, a person, who is aggrieved by any of those orders, can approach the Tribunal. Section 29 of the NGT Act puts a bar on the jurisdiction of a civil court in those matters which Tribunal is empowered to determine under its appellate jurisdiction. Further, as per section 33, provisions of NGT Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force.

The NGT also provides remedy in a situation where an injury is suffered by a person. Hence, where death of, or injury to, any person (other than a “workman”) is resulted from any accident or activity under Schedule I legislations, Section 17 of the NGT Act empowers the Tribunal to determine compensation in such cases. In case of an accident, Tribunal should apply the principle of no fault [See: Section 17(3)].

Section 18(2) of the NGT Act provides the list of persons who can make an application for settlement of dispute or grant of relief or compensation before the Tribunal:

a.        the person, who has sustained the injury; or

b.       the owner of the property to which the damage has been caused; or

c.       where death has resulted from the environmental damage, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or

d.      any agent duly authorised by such person or owner of such property or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be; or

e.       any person aggrieved, including any representative body or organisation; or

f.        the Central Government or a State Government or a Union territory Administration or the Central Pollution Control Board or a State Pollution Control Board or a Pollution Control Committee or a local authority, or any environmental authority constituted or established under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 or any other law for the time being in force

Under clause (e) of Section 18(2), any aggrieved person can be approach the Tribunal. Indeed, such a lenient provision is necessary when issues, like environment, are concerned.

While making orders or awards, The Tribunal has to, in accordance with Section 20 of the NGT Act, apply the principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle. These are the basis provisions that provide for the matters which the Tribunal can entertain. We promise you that we will also come up with posts thereby discussing each of the principles, mentioned under Section 20 of the NGT Act, in detail.

---

[1] Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog Sangathan v. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 326, 347

Medium of Instruction in Primary School: Can it be made mandatory by the Government?

“Whether a student or a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage?”

Most likely, one would answer this question affirmatively. The answer, however, may not be that easy. A division bench of the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) has, in a set of writ petitions [State of Karnataka v. The Associated Management of (Govt. Recognized unaided English medium) Primary and Secondary Schools & Ors], referred this question to a Constitutional Bench. Whatever will be the outcome of the case, the same will definitely have far reaching consequences on primary education in the country. 

The present case, by means of an appeal against the division bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court (“High Court”), had been filed by the State of Karnataka.

(Image Courtesy: Google Images)

Factual Background:

In 1982, Government of Karnataka (“State Government”) issued an order thereby prescribing that Kannada shall be the sole first language from 1^st standard of primary school itself. The order was challenged before the High Court, which held this as unconstitutional.  Thereafter, in 1989, State Government, vide an order (“1989 Order”), made “mother tongue” as the medium of instruction at the primary school level. Along with this, State Government made it obligatory for one to take “Kannada” as second language, if the same has not been chosen as the first language. The 1989 order was challenged before the Supreme Court in English Medium Students Parents Association vs.  The State of Karnataka & Ors, which consequently upheld it.

Following this, in 1994, State Government came up with another order (“1994 Order”) which, after revising the policy, made the ‘medium of instruction’ from 1^st to 4^th standard in all schools recognised by the State Government as either Kannada or mother tongue. Contending 1994 order as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21, 29(2) and 30(1) of the Constitution of India (“Constitution”), writ petitions were filed before the High Court. By its order, full bench of the High Court quashed the disputed clause No. 2, 3, 6 and 8 of the 1994 Order with its application to schools other than the schools run or aided by the Government. It is against this order of the High Court that the State Government has preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court, i.e., the present case.

What is the issue?

On one hand, it is the State Government that wants schools recognised by it to impart primary education in mother tongue or Kannda. On the other hand, there is a group which [consisting of parents and the schools] wishes to impart such primary education in English language. If one does not want one’s wards to study in a particular language; or, if one wants them to study in a particular language, can such wish be declined by the State Government? This is, in fact, a very vital question.

On behalf of the State Government, arguments were made by P.P.Rao, Senior Advocate and an eminent constitutional lawyer. He argued that the High Court failed to notice the mandate behind Article 350A of the Constitution, and further argued that the High Court ignored the decision of Supreme Court in English Medium Students Parents Association vs.  The State of Karnataka & Ors

On the other hand, counsel for the respondent contended that English Medium Students Parents Association case did not go into the question of medium of instruction. Rather, it dealt only with question of mother tongue/Kannada as one of the language. However, Supreme Court, in the present petition, held that the English Medium Students Parents Association case dealt with the question pertaining to the “medium of instruction”.

In conclusion, following are the significant questions that will be decided by the Constitutional Bench:

(i)What does Mother tongue mean? If it referred to as the language in which the child is comfortable with, then who will decide the same?

(ii) Whether a student or a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage?

(iii) Does  the  imposition  of  mother  tongue  in  any  way affects  the  fundamental  rights  under  Article  14,  19, 29 and 30 of the Constitution?

(iv) Whether  the  Government  recognized  schools  are inclusive  of  both  government-aided  schools  and private & unaided schools?

(v) Whether  the  State  can  by  virtue  of  Article  350-A  of the  Constitution  compel  the  linguistic  minorities  to choose  their  mother  tongue  only  as  medium  of instruction in primary schools?

Who can prefer an appeal before the Supreme Court

A landmark legal development has been the United States Supreme Court's branding of the contentious Federal Defence of Marriage Act (DOMA) as unconstitutional in Hollingsworthv. Perry. While doing so it also rejected an appeal from a Californian lower court's decision invalidating Proposition 8, a statute that sought to discriminate against homosexual people. In fact, the court refused to go into the merits of Proposition 8 stating that the appellants did not have the requisite locus standi to invoke the court's (Supreme Court's) jurisdiction as the appeal was not preferred by the State of California but by a group of private individuals who had sponsored the proposition.

The decision is particularly important in the Indian context as an appeal against the Delhi High Court's 2009 Naz Foundation judgment is pending before the Indian Supreme Court. In that decision the High Court deemed Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code to be unconstitutional for criminalizing sexual relations between consenting homosexual adults. The interesting point about the appeal is that the original respondents to the case, The National Capital of Delhi and The Union of India haven't preferred it, with the Attorney General unequivocally stating the Government's full acceptance of the High Court's verdict. Who then are the appellants? They are a motley of private individuals from different sections of the society, thus giving rise to obvious jurisdictional issues. In light of the US Supreme Court verdict the Indian Supreme Court may not even go into the merits of the case as the appellants, not being the state but private individuals, do not have the right to enforce the statute they seek to defend, thereby invalidating their locus standi. However, will the Supreme Court follow this route? In an erudite and brilliantly written piece Mr. Vikram Raghavan, a senior counsel with the World Bank, has sought to elucidate this interesting legal principle.